GE 2011 aftermath, random quick thoughts, and prognostications.

This post is going to be written stream-of-consciousness style...
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Is the PAP going to mend its ways, or is it going to be business as usual? I would like to think the former will happen, but I am very skeptical. Many PAP politicians seem too ideologically wedded to their positions (Mah Bow Tan, Lim Swee Say, Lui Tuck Yew, the list goes on...). Certainly, few if any would publicly backtrack on their stated policies. The PM apologised in this election for his government's performance (garnering a 3.2% improvement in vote share for Ang Mo Kio relative to GE 2006), but tellingly, no other politician did, least of all those who were responsible for policies causing the most grief to the electorate (e.g. Mah Bow Tan). Still, given the apparent act of contrition by the PM, a wait-and-see approach seems warranted.

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More people will be willing to step forward to stand for elections for opposition parties, particularly the WP. The risk-reward ratio has changed with the WP's success in Aljunied. The WP can only grow stronger with their increased popularity and rising public profile. I have no doubt their efforts at recruitment of quality candidates from the private sector will be far more fruitful than the PAP, as I have previously stated.
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The practice of slipping in weak PAP candidates into Parliament via "safe" GRCs helmed by prominent politicians will be reassessed by the PAP. That doesn't mean that the practice will be abandoned, only that it will be exercised with greater care. Frankly, the fact that the PAP had to scrape up a Tin Pei Ling from the bottom of the barrel to make up the numbers betrays the difficulty they have in recruiting loyal, quality candidates in number. The parachute tactic will continue to be a necessary part of the PAP's election arsenal as long as Tin Pei Ling-types continue to be selected.

However, I am grateful for one thing. Thanks to the fact that Marine Parade GRC was actually contested in GE 2011 (the last time it was contested was in 1991!), it is now possible to quantify the effect of the parachute tactic on vote share (the "Tin Pei Ling effect").

Marine Parade GRC, helmed by Goh Chok Tong in 1991, secured 77.2% of the vote share, versus 56.65% in 2011. The average PAP vote share in 1991 was 61%, versus 60.14% in 2011, virtually the same. The TPL effect could hence have accounted for as much as a 19.69% [(77.2%-56.65%)-(61%-60.14%)] swing in vote share.

This estimate is a high ceiling estimate; the swing in vote share can also be attributed to Goh Chok Tong's diminished popularity, the fact that he is no longer PM as he was in 1991, the generally inferior quality of opposition party candidates in 1991, and of course, the polar opposite "Nicole Seah effect". Granted all that and the fact that 1991 and 2011 are literally 20 years apart, but I think the TPL effect is probably good for a 5% vote swing against the PAP.

Given that the PAP's average vote share in GE 2011 stands at about 60%, that means that a GRC "lifeboat" can probably only comfortably accommodate at most one low quality free-rider, assuming linear additivity. More than that and the PAP risks sinking the entire GRC.

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Prof Jayakumar has noted that the fact that an Opposition had won a Group Representation Constituency (GRC) proves that the political system in Singapore works and does not benefit only the ruling party (see here). This statement is disingenuous. The fact that it has taken this long for an opposition party to win a GRC, with a team clearly superior to the one fielded by the PAP in Aljunied, in a more favorable political climate, and almost all constituencies contested that hence diluted the PAP's strength, is an exception that proves the rule that GRCs disadvantage opposition parties.

It is possible that with the loss of Aljunied, the PAP may rejig the GRC system to stack the deck further in its favor. Jayakumar's statement above provides the perfect validation for such a tactic.

It is especially important for the PAP to adjust the GRC system if more Tin Pei Ling-types are to be put up by the PAP in future elections. Lifeboats need to get bigger for a wider margin of safety. Equally, the PAP is having difficulty recruiting quality candidates in number to "hold down the fort". Cabinet ministers and other heavy-weights can only be spread so thinly over so many constituencies. We may see the advent of 8-member GRCs in the not-too-distant future.

Perhaps a more stringent requirement to have not one but two minority race candidates in each GRC. Perhaps even a hard requirement to have one Malay and one Indian candidate in each GRC. This would raise barriers to entry for the opposition even higher than they already are now.

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One of the most startling things I observed when I stepped into a polling station for the very first time was the sheer number of old folks streaming in to vote. They came on walkers, canes and wheelchairs. Singapore's population has aged, and the oldest, staunchest of the PAP's supporters are literally aging and dying.

Lee Kuan Yew *may* have been right in saying that the young don't know better to vote PAP don't appreciate the struggles that we have gone through as a nation. Nonetheless, even the PAP has to acknowledge the relentless tide of mortality that is carrying away its most loyal bloc of voters. It must adjust its strategy and tactics accordingly if it is to remain victorious in the elections ahead. The Generational Shift Effect is starting to make itself felt, and it will grow stronger in the years to come.

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If the recent PAP campaign is any indicator of how the PAP manages its internal affairs in planning and implementing public policies, then I am apprehensive what the future holds.

We had ministers saying things that contradicted each other, unilateral party reform proposed by one minister, and blame-shifting. Not to forget the MM's vote-WP-and-repent threat. Or the PM's apology that was followed by conspicuous silence by all the other ministers.

Ladies and gentlemen, it appears that we have preliminary indications of schisms and factionalism within the PAP itself. If this is what happens in public, what happens behind closed doors?

Then there is that vexing matter of who the next PM should be, as there is no heir apparent waiting in the wings at the moment. That means that the issue of succession is still very much undecided.

The PM can reshuffle ministers and redeploy those who are the most unpopular but who were nonetheless re-elected (Mah Bow Tan comes to mind). But every time he does so, he expends just that much more of his political capital within the PAP. If you were Mah Bow Tan and you kept insisting that housing was affordable, how kindly would you look on the PM deciding to reassign you to a different portfolio? You can only push people so much before they start pushing back.

The electorate is changing and demanding more choices. Is it possible that the PAP may also be changing and becoming more individualistic? And what might that mean for policy-making in the future?

Assessing the Generational Shift Effect in GE 2011

This is a technical post, so it will be rather dry. Going by previous pageviews, I doubt many people will be interested to read further, but nonetheless, I will need to perform the analysis and archive the results here for my own records.

The Generational Shift Effect (GSE) was previously defined here. The objective of this post is to assess whether such an effect is in fact present.

Given the differences between each election in terms of candidates, issues and media use, it is a futile exercise to rigorously reduce the results of each election to individually quantifiable covariates. My approach here is to simply look at the data and to check for interesting trends.

To recap, the constituencies that I identified as possibly manifesting the GSE were Radin Mas, Pioneer, Moulmein-Kallang, Sembawang, Sengkang West and Punggol East. This group consists of 4 SMCs and 2 GRCs.

My approach is to compare the PAP's vote share in each constituency in GE 2011 and to compare it against the PAP's vote share in the most recent previous election. However, except for Sembawang (which in fact has had its boundaries redrawn), none of the constituencies in the group above existed in recent history prior to GE 2011. This may seem like a bad thing, but it does have a silver lining.

While previous data may not be directly comparable to current data due to redrawn GRC boundaries, every new constituency in 2011 has a progenitor GRC. We can compare the PAP's vote share for say, Sengkang West SMC in 2011 versus Ang Mo Kio GRC (its progenitor) in 2006. We can also compare the PAP's vote share for Sengkang West SMC in 2011 against Ang Mo Kio GRC in 2011. So, in effect, we have two data points for comparison.

What we are really interested in are differences. Using our example above, we can calculate how well the PAP fared in Sengkang West in 2011 versus 2006 (using Ang Mo Kio as a proxy), taking the difference [1st difference]. We can also calculate how well the PAP fared in Ang Mo Kio between 2011 and 2006, again taking the difference [2nd difference]. It is the divergence between these two differences that may be attributed to the GSE (and other factors).

Now, let's turn to the data. I have excluded Radin Mas SMC from this analysis. Radin Mas was carved out from Tanjong Pagar, which has had walkovers for the longest time, so historical voting data is unavailable. In addition, the 'Lee Kuan Yew effect' in Tanjong Pagar would probably swamp any other effect, so I'm not even going to bother with further analysis here.

Table 1 below shows PAP vote shares for the constituencies of interest in GE 2011 as well as the most recent election. Except for Sembawang GRC, data for the previous election is taken from the progenitor GRC. Also, all previous data relates to GE 2006, except for West Coast GRC, which was last contested in GE 1997.

  Table 1. Comparing PAP vote shares for each constituency across elections. Larger image here.  

  

From Table 1, it is clear that the PAP's vote share has declined for all the constituencies under study. But how does this compare to the progenitor GRCs?


Table 2 below reproduces the rightmost column from Table 1, and includes another column showing the change in the PAP's vote share in the progenitor GRCs. Note that Moulmein-Kallang progenitor data is unavailable since Moulmein-Kallang was carved out of Tanjong Pagar and Jalan Besar. Tanjong Pagar was uncontested and Jalan Besar no longer exists. In addition, I have included a column to show the change in the PAP's average vote share across elections.

Table 2. Comparing changes in PAP vote shares. Larger image here.

In every constituency under study (except Sembawang and Moulmein-Kallang), the drop in the PAP's vote share has exceeded the drop in the PAP's vote share in the progenitor GRC. It has also exceeded the drop in the average PAP vote share across elections. Most striking is the divergence seen in Sengkang West, which experienced a drop in PAP vote share by 8% while in contrast, its progenitor GRC of Ang Mo Kio actually improved in its PAP vote share by 3.2%.


In the case of Sengkang West, the large divergence in PAP vote share between Sengkang West and its progenitor is unlikely to be due to the GSE. It is far more likely due to the fact that Ang Mo Kio is helmed by PM Lee Hsien Loong. Similarly, the divergence for Punggol East may be explained by the presence of heavyweight Teo Chee Hean in progenitor Pasir Ris-Punggol. On an opposite note, Moulmein-Kallang's poor performance for the PAP in 2011 may be more attributable to the presence of Yaacob Ibrahim (Orchard Road floods) and Lui Tuck Yew (hardly a ray of sunshine, see here).

For the remaining 2 constituencies, it is more difficult to reject the presence of the GSE. Khaw Boon Wan helms Sembawang GRC. Notwithstanding his $8 gaffe, he is still one of the PAP's more popular and stalwart politicians. Yet Sembawang fared poorly relative to the fall in the PAP's average vote share in this election (-12.8% vs -6.5%). This is an unexpected result which I interpret as the GSE exerting itself. For Pioneer SMC, I can't think of major reasons for the larger than expected fall in vote share except for the possibility that Pioneer is demographically much different from its progenitor, West Coast GRC. Again, I think the GSE could have exerted itself here.

Table 3 below summarizes the foregoing discussion in assessing the GSE. I have included a column showing which opposition parties contested in each constituency for GE 2011. Note that Sembawang and Pioneer, which I flagged as having a high likelihood of GSE, were contested by SDP and NSP respectively. The WP was the big opposition party winner in this election, presumably due to their branding, as surmised by Yawning Bread. So, we can exclude the "WP effect" from explaining the large falls in PAP vote share these two constituencies. In addition, neither SDP nor NSP fielded their 'A' teams or top candidates in these constituencies as well, so candidate differences should be muted.

Table 3. Likelihood of GSE and possible explanations. Larger image here.

Voting along municipal lines: Penny-wise, Pound Foolish

I have never accepted the logic behind voting along municipal lines in Singapore. Never.

For many years, one of the main reasons that Singaporeans have given for not voting for opposition party candidates is that the quality of candidates standing in their constituencies has been poor. And the quality of opposition party candidates has indeed been generally poor for much of Singapore's history.

Even Singaporeans disgruntled with the PAP frequently vote for the PAP when they perceive that opposition party candidates in their constituencies are inferior in breeding, credentials or capability compared to PAP candidates, which is often. I expect this election to be no different.

On the surface, this would make perfect sense. After all, who wants a doofus to represent them in Parliament? How could a clown the likes of many opposition party politicians effectively champion the interests of their constituents, particularly in a PAP-dominated parliament that is known to place Singaporeans in opposition wards last?

To me, however, this is missing the point entirely. Think of the last 5, 10 years. What issues have impacted your life the most? What have your heaviest concerns been about? What are the root causes of your worries, your angsts, and the things that keep you up late at night?

Almost without exception, I think I can state categorically that the most immediate concerns of most Singaporeans stem from issues related to national policies implemented in the last 10 years. These policies heavily impact important issues such as the cost of living, housing, influx of foreigners, income inequality, unemployment, health care, retirement and education.

In Singapore, the PAP designs and implements all major policies that govern the lives of Singaporeans. These are NATIONAL policies. In this country, national policies impact your life the most, and they have far-reaching effects on you, your family and your children.

These policies are more important than whether your MP can successfully petition for public funds to be spent in your constituency on playgrounds, covered walkways, refurbished wet markets and other matters that I deem of little consequence. Even the value of your property (if you own one) is dictated more by decisions made at the national level, e.g. zoning and land use planning done by the URA, or transportation infrastructure planned by the LTA.

If you feel hard done in by the PAP's policies, and practically every middle-class or lower income Singaporean is a victim on some level or in some aspect of their life, but you vote PAP because you think that the opposition party candidates standing in your constituency "cannot make it", then you are shooting yourself in the foot. You are being penny-wise, but pound foolish.

Realistically speaking, the PAP will still form the next government after this election due to the preponderance of their vote-share. That means they will still get to appoint all the cabinet ministers and still get to set all national policies.

This election is not about forming a new government. It is a referendum on the policies set by the present government. If you can't stomach the thought of voting in that unknown MP wannabe from the opposition in your constituency, think of it not as him representing your interests, but as him a visible signal of your displeasure with the PAP and how they must change their policies for the benefit of all Singaporeans.

All of the above would be true even if the quality of all opposition candidates was uniformly poor. But that is not true today. Today, the quality of many opposition candidates is as good, if not better, than the PAP candidates.

Many Singaporeans are excited about the contest in Aljunied, and I dare say, envious. They are envious not because voters in Aljunied actually have a realistic chance of voting in opposition party politicians in this election, but because Aljunied voters are in an enviable position of having to pick between two credible teams vying for their vote. It is not a dilemma, as some fool of a PAP supporter pointed out. It is a lovely feeling to be courted. A feeling that unfortunately few Singaporeans can claim to have experienced.

If you live in a constituency that has credible opposition party candidates, and you are unhappy with the current government's policies, you have no excuse not to vote for the opposition party.

If you are like me, and you live in a constituency contested by opposition party candidates that lack credibility, you still have good reason to vote for the opposition if you have felt victimized by our current government's policies. As I have highlighted above, voting along municipal lines is a case of being penny-wise, pound foolish. The wiser decision would be to vote along party lines.

Related to this is the great fear, played up by the PAP and their sycophantic mainstream media, that voting in opposition party candidates is tantamount to inviting legislative gridlock.

First of all, as I have pointed out above, legislative gridlock is a dim possibility given that the PAP is unlikely to lose more than 50% of seats in parliament. They will likely still get to pass all the policies they want. In fact, they are likely to retain more than the two thirds majority required to change the constitution at will, the highest law in the land.

Secondly, and this is an important point that I have not seen anyone in the media or blogosphere make, from my perspective as an average Singaporean, I do not think that legislative gridlock is such a bad thing if the policies that would have resulted otherwise were to impact my life negatively.

The PAP's greatest claim to fame is their contribution to economic growth. But as is patently clear to anyone who has an operating brain cell, the fruits of economic growth in this country have not been shared evenly, just like their costs. With every gain, there is a concomitant cost. The impressive rate of economic growth in recent years looks considerably less impressive when one takes into account the increased stresses that all of us experience from the rising cost of living, yawning income gaps, longer working hours, angst over retirement, more foreigners and strained infrastructure.

With regard to economic growth, ask yourself this: cui bono? Then ask yourself, who has borne the bulk of the costs?

Net-net, do you genuinely think that you are better off today? You MUST know the answer to this question if you are to vote wisely.

As a Singaporean, the last thing that I want in a government are smart, ambitious, capable people working against my best interests. Gridlock would be preferable. As Warren Buffett once put it, "In looking for people to hire, you look for three qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy. And if they don't have the first, the other two will kill you."

Even though the opposition party candidates in my constituency are less than impressive, I value them for what they are and what they represent to the PAP, rather than what they can do for me. I may not think highly of them, but they disagree with current PAP policy and like every opposition party, it is part of their campaign platform. As an instrument to convey my displeasure, that will suffice for my vote, at least for now.  

When in doubt, turn to the data (Generational Shift Effect)

"Younger voters in their 20s are more likely to vote for opposition parties than for the PAP. Conversely, older voters in their 50s and above are more likely to vote for the PAP."

If you do not agree with the above statement, you may safely ignore the rest of this post. If you do agree with the statement, then read on.

Nomination Day has come and gone and the battle lines have been drawn. The chips are in the air now, and who knows where they will fall?

I asked myself the same question and decided a little data sleuthing was in order.

I am no pundit, and I lack mystical powers that allow me to read the sentiment on the ground. What I have however, is census data, and a belief that younger folks are more likely to want change, while older folks would prefer the status quo.

The logical question to ask then, is in which constituencies do younger folks comprise a larger percentage of the population now, while older folks comprise a smaller percentage of the population?

Demographic data by geographical region is available from Census 2000 and Census 2010. Note that geographical regions in Census 2010 are demarcated by the URA 2008 Masterplan available here. The most distinctive differences between the geographical regions demarcated by Census 2010 and Census 2000 are that Census 2010 includes 3 new regions: Singapore River, Mandai and Punggol. However, only Punggol among the three has a significant population today. Otherwise, I am assuming here that differences in geographical regions between the two census are small.

Those Singapore citizens who were aged 40 and above back in year 2000 are now aged 50 and above. In every single region, they comprise a smaller percentage of that region's population today due to the effects of mortality. In contrast, those Singapore citizens who were aged 10-19 in year 2000 are now aged 20 - 29 and of eligible voting age. Not all geographical regions have experienced an increase in the percentage of population who are of this young age group, due to marriage as well as moving out of the family home. However, in most geographical regions, they now do constitute a larger percentage of the population than in year 2000.

Why did I choose these age cut-off points? Because previous data analysis revealed that new PRs in the last 10 years are overwhelmingly in their 20s and 30s today. I can't separate out the new PRs from the citizens among the younger Singapore residents, but I can safely assume that census data relating to residents aged 50 and above today is unadulterated by the addition of new PRs .

For every geographical region, I calculated 4 numbers:

(1) Percentage of population older than 10 that was aged 10-19 in year 2000

(2) Percentage of voting population aged 20-29 in year 2010

(3) Percentage of population older than 10 that was aged 40 and above in year 2000

(4) Percentage of voting population aged 50 and above in year 2010

I define here the Generational Shift Effect (GSE)

GSE = [(2) - (1)] - [(4) - (3)]

or more simply

GSE = (2) - (1) - (4) + (3)

The GSE is an indicator of how much younger a population in a geographical region has become since the last census in 2000, and by extension, how much more likely a geographical region is likely to swing away from the PAP in this election as compared to the election in 2001.

Below is a table showing the regions with GSEs larger than 10%.

Larger image available here.

The next step is to match the geographical regions in the census data with the electoral map. The most detailed electoral map I could find is available here.

I lack the technical skills to superimpose the 2008 URA Masterplan with the electoral map, so all I did was to eye-ball the two maps and judge which constituency each geographical region with GSE > 10% fell in. These affected constituencies are indicated in the rightmost column in the table above.

Naturally, some geographical regions are small, so they are swamped by the rest of the constituency they fall into. However, a few geographical regions occupy enough of a constituency that I deem it possible that the GSE will manifest itself in these constituencies in this election. These constituencies have been bolded in the table above. Tanjong Pagar is a walkover constituency, so it has not been bolded.

The constituencies in which the GSE is most likely to manifest itself are, IMHO, Radin Mas, Pioneer, Moulmein-Kallang, Sembawang, Sengkang West and Punggol East.

These constituencies won't necessarily be lost by the PAP; it's just that I predict the fight will be closer than most people expect.

As I have previously mentioned, one of the effects of gerrymandering (and walkovers) is that the PAP has distorted the voting signals upon which political parties rely on to judge ground sentiment over the years. If the GSE is as significant as I expect it to be, it may come as a surprise to some people should it exert itself in this election.

On a separate note, interestingly, Tanjong Pagar is a constituency in which the GSE is very strong. However, it is a walkover constituency helmed by Lee Kuan Yew. When Lee Kuan Yew retires from his political career, I fully expect the GSE to exert itself in the following election. Many of his staunchest supporters are growing as old as he is and dying off. The numbers reflect this.

When in doubt, turn to the data (GDP and Median Household Income)

In the vein of the previous post, I will be analyzing data published by the government and available in the public domain to obtain a better understanding of issues important to this election. These posts have been motivated by the recent completion of Census 2010 and the impending election.

Today, we will compare GDP growth and the growth in median household income.

Information was obtained on GDP per capita (GDPC) at current market prices and median household income (MHI).

The charts below show that GDPC is positively correlated with MHI.

However, the growth in GDPC has far outpaced growth in MHI. For example, from 1999 to 2010, GDPC increased by 64.58%, while MHI increased by only 42.86%.

But let's be rigorous, lest I be accused of being selective about the base year in supporting my conclusions.

The table below shows the cumulative percentage increase in GDPC and MHI using each year between 1999 and 2010 as the base year. In each cell, the first percentage refers to GDPC and the second percentage (in parentheses) refers to MHI. Cells in which cumulative percentage increases in GDPC have outstripped MHI have been shaded red. Cells in which the opposite has occurred have been shaded blue.

There are a total of 46 red cells out of a total of 66 cells, meaning that MHI has on average fared worse than GDPC, base year effect or no.

Under the null hypothesis that each cell has 50-50 odds of being shaded blue or red, using a Gaussian approximation implies that such a result would occur less than 0.01% of the time if it were purely due to chance. Indeed, the test statistic is 3.2003, at the extreme right tail of the distribution.

But of course, such a statistical test is not truly valid, since data in each cell, being time-series data, is not independent of data in other cells. There is a dependency among the cells that violates the independence assumption of such a simple statistical test. Nonetheless, the results are illustrative.

Let's look at the data more closely. The chart below shows the annual rate of change (ARC) in GDPC and MHI for the years 2000 through to 2010.

It appears that the ARC for GDPC lies above MHI for 8 out of the 11 years. 

In addition, the AAGR for MHI lies above GDPC only in periods of recession (dot-com in 2000, the recent financial crisis). Why is this important? Because in periods of recession, the unemployment rate rises and unemployment disproportionately affects the lower income groups with below MHI. This causes less downside volatility in the MHI during a recession. In contrast, a strong economy creates full employment which tends to drive up incomes across the board.

In other words, MHI is more sensitive to economic booms than busts. This may account for why the AAGR for MHI is above the AAGR for GDPC only in times of recession.

I think I can safely say that MHI has lagged behind GDPC over the last 10 years.

But let's not stop there.

MHI refers to median household income. Household income may have increased over the years because workers in the household are being paid more. But it may also have increased because there are now more workers in each household, or workers are now working longer hours.

The government doesn't provide data on the median hourly wage. But census and household surveys helpfully provide data on the number of workers in each household (2000, 2005 and 2010), as well as the number of hours worked each week by each worker (2000, 2005, data not yet available for 2010). Time-series data on number of hours worked each week is available from MOM here, but I would prefer to stick to using census data for source consistency.

Data on number of workers in each household was grouped for large households, e.g. all households with 5 or more workers were grouped together. Data on number of persons in each household was similarly grouped for large households, e.g. all households with 8 or more persons were grouped together. I ignored the "more than" part when I calculated the weighted average number of workers and number of persons in each household.

The data is presented below. Note that year 2005 was problematic, as grouping was done for households with 4 or more workers, and 6 or more persons (as opposed to 5 or more workers and 8 or more persons, as was seen in years 2000 and 2010). This may have accounted for the break in trend in 2005 for weighted average number of workers per household. Nonetheless, there are more workers on average per household in year 2010 as compared to year 2000.

From the data, it appears that Singapore resident households are increasing in their average number of workers per household even as households are becoming smaller. This is unsurprising due to the increasing prevalence of two-income households and fewer kids.

For the data on number of hours worked each week, the number of hours was reported in bands. I took the mid-point of each band and calculated the weighted average number of hours worked per worker. For the extremely hard workers who work 65 or more hours per week, I assumed that the midpoint of this band was 72.5 hours. This is arbitrary, but unimportant as only a small percentage of the population works such long hours.

The weighted average number of hours worked per week was 47.47 in 2000 and 48.22 in 2005. Data is unavailable from Census 2010. But the two data points suggest an increase over time.

So, not only has MHI lagged GDPC, when adjusted for number of workers in each household and number of hours worked each week, the picture looks even worse.

But again, let's press on further.

One of the effects of the surge in housing prices, lacklustre growth in MHI and burgeoning income inequality is that people have increasingly moved to the outskirts of the island. Think Sengkang and Punggol where new flats have been built in the last 10 years. How have travel times to work changed?

Data on travel times to work is available for 2005 and 2010, but not for 2000.

Using the same methodology as above, I calculated a weighted average travelling time to work. For the extreme band of people who take more than 1 hour to get to work, I assumed a midpoint of 75 minutes. Note that in 2005, 5.09% of workers took more than 1 hour to get to work, while in 2010, 6.19% of workers fell into that group.

The weighted average travelling time was 30.33 minutes in 2005 and 31.81 minutes in 2010. Again, the Singapore worker is worse off.

I think I've made my case: The PAP has sucked at its job in improving the lot of Singaporeans as measured by MHI relative to GDP growth over the last 10 years.

I wish I had the data on annual remuneration for cabinet ministers over the last 10 years. That data I am confident will keep pace with GDP growth.

When in doubt, turn to the data (Immigration)

Census 2010 was completed last year. A census is a rich data source to mine for information. Since the government mouthpiece media is so completely useless in reporting news that I actually want to read, that might affect my voting decision, I have to obtain the data sets and perform the analysis myself.

If you want something done...

Readers may consider this post and my next few posts a public sharing service. All data sets obtained from Statistics Singapore.

Data for the following 3 charts obtained from here; pages v and 3. Note that SingStat considers Singapore residents to be comprised of Singapore citizens AND permanent residents.

Needless to say, foreigners as a percentage of our population have skyrocketed in the last 6 years. As of last year, 1 out of every 3 persons (36%)  you see on the street is a foreigner.

The annualized growth rate for foreigners is even more astounding. See below.

Now let's turn to PRs and naturalized citizens.

SingStat does not distinguish between Singapore citizens and PRs in much of the data it reports, so it is difficult to get a handle on what characteristics differentiate citizens from PRs, such as age, race, sex, income level etc. I think it likely that it has this kind of data, but for whatever reason, it does not disclose this to the unwashed public. Too incendiary sensitive, I suppose.

Nonetheless, I can reconstruct data sets and make an educated guess at the age and sex profile of new PRs in the last 10 years by employing some actuarial tricks.

Data for this section of the post is obtained from Census 2000 Demographics Table 3 and Census 2010 Demographics Table 3. These tables break down the Singapore resident population into single years of age.

It is possible to use the Census 2000 data to project the expected breakdown of the Singapore resident population in 2010 by single years of age. To do this, we adjust the Census 2000 data by applying mortality rates, calculated from the 2005 complete life tables. I chose the 2005 tables for as an average as they fall midway between years 2000 and 2010, when the Census was held.

For example, a group of say, 21166 male babies aged between 0 and 1 year of age back in year 2000 should become a group of 21088 ten year olds due to the effects of mortality. However, there were in fact 24463 male ten year old Singapore residents in Census 2010.

I compared expected and actual numbers for both female and male Singapore residents for all ages starting from 0 to 89. I truncated the data beyond age 89 due to the small numbers of individuals involved and the difficulty in dealing with aggregated data.

The chart below shows (Actual - Expected Number of Singapore residents) plotted against age.

The difference in expected and actual numbers is accounted for by random fluctuations in mortality, citizens and existing PRs travelling abroad/returning to Singapore from abroad, and of course, new citizens and PRs.

In relation to travel for example, many students head to overseas universities to study. So, Singapore residents aged 8 to 15 in year 2000 are likely to show a larger than expected dip in numbers, more than mortality can solely account for, when they become the group of Singapore residents aged 18 to 25 in year 2010. They could be captured in the 2000 Census, but be abroad at the time of the 2010 Census.

Similarly, the group of Singapore residents aged 18 to 25 in year 2000 who were not captured in the 2000 Census may become a bigger group of residents aged 28 to 35 in year 2010 due to return from overseas studies.

However, we do not see this pattern in the data. There is a consistent positive divergence between actual and expected number of Singapore residents from age 10 all the way to age 50 (for males), and age 47 (for females).

What about Singapore citizens who head abroad to work and then subsequently return?This is unlikely to have great effect given that people are moving away and coming back all the time; the inflow and outflow should be matched, if not exactly equal. 

The likeliest assumption to account for most of the divergence between actual and expected numbers is the increase in new PRs. This is not unreasonable given that between 2000 and 2010, we know for a fact that we added about 254000 PRs to our population (Census data 2000 and 2010). In comparison, my chart above shows that the sum of (Actual - Expected) for ages 10 through 50 add up to 269000, a difference of only about 6% from 254000.

Thus, my interpretation of the data is this:

There have been approximately 250000 new PRs in the last 10 years. Considerably more new PRs in the last 10 years are female than male (we're talking ~28% more females than males).

Most new PRs in the last 10 years are today, aged in their late 20s to early 40s. There is a small bump in the LHS of the chart that indicates that significant numbers of new PRs are kids born in Singapore to foreigner or PR parents. Either that, or many Singapore citizens had their kids abroad and brought them back in the last 10 years (also possible).

There is a persistent trend of (small) negative numbers in the chart above the age of about 50 (males) and 47 (females). Given the consistent negative numbers across ages above these two ages, this is unlikely to be a random fluctuation in mortality. This indicates that a number of Singapore residents (most likely PRs) leave the population through emigration rather than mortality.

PRs aren't necessarily leaving only after the ages of 50 and 47. More generally, the rate of PR departure starts to exceed the rate of PR arrival at these ages. The mean age at which PRs give up their PR is likely to be lower.

Note that Singapore isn't necessarily retaining large numbers of PRs even though the negative numbers past the age of about 50 are small relative to the big positive surges in the ages of 20 through 50. It is important to note that the departing PRs and the surge in new PRs relate to different ages and hence cohorts. Our new PRs who are now aged in their 20s and 30s today could well leave en masse five, ten or twenty years from now.

I reiterate the assumptions: I am ignoring new citizenship take-up, and emigration/travel abroad/return from abroad by Singapore residents, and attributing the divergence between actual and expected numbers of Singapore residents to PRs alone. These are not trivial assumptions to make, but I believe that these are reasonable assumptions in light of the data I have.

And all that is certainly more information than you're ever going to be able to get out of the government.

Why the PAP is finding it difficult to attract candidates from the private sector

I had thought that more people would have commented on the story published in the Straits Times on 16 April, on how few high flying executives from the private sector are willing to join the PAP. But apparently not.

Someone did comment on it, but while I do agree with some of the ideas in that post, my opinion is a little different, and more nuanced.

Why is the PAP finding it difficult to attract candidates from the private sector?

To answer that question, we must first ask why people enter politics.

People enter politics for a number of reasons, but the most important (and noble) reason must be the idea of wanting to make a difference.

Many of the most celebrated politicians in history took on positions of leadership precisely at the point when they perceived the need for a change in direction for their country. Take FDR for example. He rose to the occasion to become POTUS at the height of the Great Depression. It is in times of crisis that we see great leaders arise. Our Minister Mentor is another example.

When you keep that fact in mind, and you consider the nature and character of the PAP as it is today, it is not a surprise that they have problems recruiting candidates from the private sector.

The PAP today is in the business of maintaining the status quo. And I do mean business. Our economic and other policies have been deemed successful by our political elite, and as such, they have signaled that no change is warranted.

With their electioneering tactics and iron-grip control of the civil service, the PAP has assured itself victory in every election. And even its greenest candidates need not fear being rejected by the electorate; they can just coast in on the coat-tails of a "heavy-weight" under the GRC system. If there were such a thing as a election guarantee in a democracy, this would be it.

In other words, the PAP of today is not a party of fiery orators, impassioned visionaries or trailblazing mavericks, full of piss and vinegar, to borrow that piquant phrase.

They don't have to be. The PAP today is a party of technocrats and functionaries, where an efficient party apparatus guarantees risk-free victory at elections, and continuity of policy after election. Policy which is set at the highest levels of the PAP food chain, if I might add, immune to criticism and disquiet even within the party itself.

Indeed, mavericks are probably personae non grata in the PAP. Some people accuse the PAP of recruiting only those that agree with their policy-making views. I would go further. In the environment of the PAP, they can ONLY recruit those who agree with their views, as a true dissenter would probably find the PAP a lonely and hostile place.

Oh, we hear of various fresh PAP faces saying that they don't agree with this or that PAP policy. Riiight. Just as our national newspaper is fond of printing both sides of an issue to give the appearance of "balance", but inevitably ends on one side of the argument: the PAP's.

Dissenters in the PAP either don't last long, are marginalized (think the late President Ong Teng Cheong when he refused the play the role of a straw puppet and actually had the temerity to request for information on the national reserves), are co-opted, or were never true dissenters to begin with.

In light of this, it is not hard to imagine why, with few exceptions, high flying corporate executives have little desire to join the PAP.

Put yourself in the shoes of a corporate high flyer who actually has aspirations to make a difference, to become a politician.

If you genuinely have issues with the PAP's policies, you are unlikely to want to join them. Trying to change the PAP from within is likely a fool's errand.

Even if you do agree with the PAP's policies, the PAP is unlikely to be a place that can satisfy your political aspirations. It's a monolithic top-down structure, where policy is decided at the top, your role is to support the status quo, and you have to toe the line. Because, after all, it's not like you enjoy an independent power base among your constituents, especially if you coasted in on the coat-tails of another politician. How independent can your opinion be when you owe your place in Parliament to another politician?

Worse, as a former corporate warrior, you would have given up your high salary, perks AND privacy. And for what? For this pale shadow of being a politician? More like a entry level political lackey.

Being a PAP Member of Parliament would be singularly unattractive in this case. It would be a corporate job without the corporate perks. In other words, it would be a step DOWN from being a corporate high flyer. Even a corporate high flyer who agrees he has benefited disproportionately from the PAP's policies and wants them to continue. No thanks, he might say, I just want a free ride on your policies.

Conversely, what kinds of people would view becoming a PAP Member of Parliament as a step up?

Simple. The people who are already in the public eye, think only glowingly of existing policy, and fall very naturally into the position of deferring to authority in the form of senior PAP politicians.

No surprise. The civil service. And the quasi-governmental organizations like the NTUC.

If you are a high-ranking civil servant, becoming a cabinet minister would represent the logical pinnacle of your civil service career progression.

Not so for a private sector corporate executive who has political aspirations. The calculus is far different.

I have a prediction here to make.

The trends are clear. The PAP is recruiting less and less from the private sector, while the converse is occurring for the opposition parties, particularly those with credibility, like the Workers Party.

Should the opposition parties actually make headway in this coming election by, say, winning a GRC, it would be a watershed moment. Being an opposition party member would demonstrably seem less risky, and more people who want to make a difference, who actually have some fire in their hearts, would join the opposition political parties from the private sector.

In contrast, because the PAP is recruiting increasingly from the public sector, it is going to be seen as more and more insular, and will find it ever harder to recruit from the private sector. No outsider wants to belong to an clubby old boys association where every former civil servant knows every other former civil servant. And over time, the PAP will become more homogeneous than it is already.