Diversity in the Top Echelons of the Public Sector

Eddie Teo wrote another open letter on PSC scholarships a few days ago. It was on *The Value of Diversity*. 

You may find it here. 

I commented on his previous letter here, and I will comment on his latest one here in this post.

My first reaction on reading his letter? Rolling my eyes inwardly, with the word "tosh" appearing in my mind.

It's all well and good that the PSC is actively soliciting scholars from less selective schools.

Unfortunately, it's a long distance from budding scholar to head honcho policymaker. And guess what? The head honchos today are the products of yesterday's scholar selection process, which means that while today's scholarship recipient may have a slightly lower probability of coming from Raffles JC or Hwa Chong, s/he almost certainly will be working under someone who did.

And who gets promoted faster? Not the mavericks, misfits or outlier types who come from non-pedigreed backgrounds, that's for sure.

"Those aspiring to be public servants should realise that their performance will often be enhanced if they can bring a new perspective to help tackle a public policy issue, gained by their stint in a “non-traditional” university or “non-traditional” country."

Oh, originality and imagination certainly get you brownie points, but Singapore's favorite kind of innovation has always been the kind that comes in a nice, neat box with a bow tied on top.

Science and engineering research? Only if there's a financial return on investment.

Arts and culture? Only if it's pretty and non-controversial, and preferably can be marketed as a tourist attraction.

Family values? Yes, certainly. No problems with keeping Section 377A on the statutes, but steamroll the casinos into Singapore over the protests. Sometimes, I really wish they did condone spousal rape and would sentence people to death for adultery here. At least it would be consistently medieval here and we would all be treated equally as serfs.

Scholars fresh out of university, who have had good grades throughout school and the same sparkling CCA records, are the most vulnerable to craving external validation. I should know: I was a scholar once upon a time too.

Your unconventional scholars with non-traditional perspectives are going to adapt to innovate within a tightly circumscribed space, drinking the Kool-Aid as it were, which will render them indistinguishable from their more pedigreed peers, or they will exit the system out of sheer frustration. 

We also do not care what schools they come from when deciding on whether or not to award a scholarship. Several of this year’s President’s Scholars came from neighbourhood primary schools [Emphasis mine].

Translation:

Yes, because of the angst-filled and heart attack-inducing process of primary one registration (just ask young parents), we know that getting into a name brand primary school is a complete crapshoot. So, obviously, we won't hold it against you.

Now, secondary schools on the other hand...

What is not said is sometimes more important than what is said...

Just as the government is changing the way it governs Singapore, Public Service leaders are learning how to manage a new generation of younger public servants, who want greater participation and more voice. The PSC’s effort to bring diversity into the Public Service will come to nought if divergent views are discouraged within the system and those who dare to question assumptions and have a non-conventional perspective are not valued and appreciated.

Eddie's thinking here is that by recruiting these non-traditional scholars from non-traditional backgrounds, they will be the leading edge of the Public Service's transformation into a more diverse and dynamic civil service.

My problem with this view is that these non-traditional scholars will either exit the system before they attain leadership positions, or they will be assimilated by the system they were meant to change from within.

Do we have evidence for the latter? Of course we do. 

While it does not follow that only those with a less fortunate background can empathize with the poor,...

...Yes, there are a few scholar public servants who lack humility and have forgotten that they are where they are because of the support and help from those around them.

The converse is not necessarily true either. The kicker is that sometimes, it is precisely the people who rose up from the bottom who turn out to the least sympathetic ones of all. Mah Bow "affordable" Tan and Ng Eng Hen came from supposedly humble backgrounds, but look at how sensitive they are to the lower strata of Singapore society. See here for instance.

Groupthink already exists in the public sector. We know this because our government willfully sticks its fingers in its ears and went "la, la, la" when we told it years ago that current immigration policy is unsustainable, and that housing and public transportation is badly in need of new investment. 

Groupthink by its very nature perpetuates itself. Thank you Eddie, for striving to put new wine in old bottles. Personally, I would do something about the bottles instead, but good on you for trying.

On the Parliament Vote to Endorse the Population White Paper - Redux: Who didn't vote?

As promised in a previous post, I kept a close watch on the release of the votes and proceedings of the parliamentary vote held on 8 February to endorse the controversial population white paper.

You may find the proceedings here. Naturally, I saved a copy to my hard drive. Even with legislation that compels the government to release this information, I have zero trust in the PAP in such matters.

And given the compromised nature of the mainstream media in reporting political news, you will never hear the specifics of the proceedings in the Straits Times, so if you find this blog post enlightening, please disseminate this as far as possible. Our citizenry need to be informed citizenry if we are to have influence in charting the course of this nation of ours.

Given the short attention spans of most people, I would not be surprised if many Singaporeans have forgotten about the specifics of who voted for what. And this was probably something that the PAP was counting on.

This post will serve as a reminder of the voting record on that fateful day.

From the parliamentary proceedings, in the matter of endorsing the population white paper, there were 77 ayes, 13 noes, and 1 abstention. There were 5 absentees on that day.

All opposition party MPs voted no.

All non-constituency MPs voted no.

Of the nominated MPs, Eugene Tan abstained, as is well known. Janice Koh, Faizah Jamal and Laurence Lien all voted against the motion, as is also known.

What was not stated in the mainstream media was that of the remaining five nominated MPs, Tan Su Shan was absent, while the remaining four voted aye.

These four, whose names were not mentioned in the media, are Nicholas Fang, Mary Liew, Ramy Dhinakaran and Teo Siong Seng.

Remember these nominated MP names. When the time comes to re-appoint the nominated MPs, it will be interesting to see who gets the nod for re-appointment, and who doesn't, and see how the re-appointment reconciles with this voting record.

Now, the most interesting part of this post.

There are 99 MPs in parliament. With 77 ayes, 13 noes, 1 abstention and 5 absentees, that still leaves 3 MPs unaccounted for.

It was known that Inderjit Singh absented himself during the vote, and well he did, given the misgivings he voiced out prior to the taking of the vote.

But who were the other two?

The answer is: Indranee Rajah and Ng Eng Hen. 

Read into that what you will. Myself? I would note that Ng Eng Hen is a Cabinet Minister, while Indranee Rajah is a Senior Minister of State, unlike Inderjit Singh who is just a regular MP. It's bad form for people that high up in the PAP hierarchy to absent themselves from a vote as widely watched as this one.

I do not have information on how or why they absented themselves. And our mainstream media doesn't seem to either, or doesn't want to tell us, or just plain doesn't want to know.


*Remember, if you found this post noteworthy, please disseminate.  As citizens, all of us need more information.

On the Parliament Vote to Endorse the Population White Paper

So much ink has been spilled on the Population White Paper. And many, many commentators have shredded it most capably in their analyses that I feel I have nothing fresh to add.

[In truth, I do have some unique opinions on the white paper and their 'sanguine' population projections. But because there are some uncertainties in my own predictions, I would prefer to wait for certain events to pass  before publishing my thoughts in the fullness of time.]

So, I am left to comment on peripheral issues. There are two in particular, one unrelated to the title of today's post. That one will be in a separate post. The topic for this post is below.

In the recent Parliamentary vote to endorse the White Paper, Low Thia Khiang called for a division to the motion.

The news article that I linked to above described it thus:

"WP leader Low Thia Kiang stunned those in attendance by standing up to ask the Speaker for a division to the motion, effectively meaning the House could not decide to pass the paper by a verbal vote. The House doors were then locked and the assembly took to an electronic vote.  "

Low Thia Khiang is more canny than most politicians. Certainly more so than your regular PAP MP who most likely coasted in on the coat-tails of a "heavy-weight" in a GRC.

Here is why Low Thia Khiang's request is important:

In the USA, there are many websites that record and consolidate the voting records of senators and representatives on bills presented before Congress.  One such website is Project VoteSmart. The idea behind such websites is that citizens can better distinguish between what politicians say and what they actually do. 

In particular, as a citizen, because you elect someone and send him or her to Parliament to represent you and your interests, it behooves you, then, to check that your representative votes on legislation in accordance to your wishes. Checking your representative's voting record is one way of seeing whether you've been taken for a ride during the election campaign.

In the vote to endorse the White Paper, there were 77 "ayes", 13 "nays" and 1 abstention. All "ayes" came from the PAP. The sole abstention was from NMP Eugene Tan. 

Notwithstanding the PAP party whip, tellingly, because there are a total of 99 MPs, there are still 8 MPs unaccounted for, 5 of which are NMPs and 3 are from the PAP. Inderjit Singh was the most prominent in being absent from the vote, being a PAP MP and one who had openly voiced his misgivings prior to the vote.

In another news article, he was quoted as saying, "All I want to say is I was not present for the vote. I spoke from my heart and will do what I can to change things."

Thanks to Low Thia Khiang's request for a division to the motion, who voted for what is now a permanent part of the parliamentary record. Clearly, a lot of people are interested in this. I expect that the record of that parliamentary vote will be found here soon.

We will see what the coming years ahead hold. And in 2016 or earlier when the next elections are held, some PAP MPs may regret not absenting themselves as Inderjit Singh did.

Even if they backtrack on their endorsement in the interim, if nothing else, because of Inderjit Singh's example, the voting record would show them to have been either spineless or indecisive.

Workers Party - The secret behind being oh-so-"conciliatory" towards the PAP

In 2007, on the eve of the 2008 Financial Crisis, the major US automakers Ford and General Motors were in trouble. They would soon approach the US government for a bailout.

In contrast, Toyota was on the ascendant. The New York Times ran an article on the contrasting fortunes of the Japanese automaker vis-a-vis its US competitors.

The money quote came from James P. Womack, founder and chairman of the Lean Enterprise Institute:

“The last thing Toyota wants is for any of those guys to collapse.” For one thing, it could be politically disastrous for the Japanese company if it were considered responsible for the death of a grand American institution. “But it’s also completely worthless to Toyota in the market,” Womack adds. “They’re selling all the vehicles they can make already. What they actually want is just continuous, slow decline — decline at the same rate that they have the ability to organically expand. That’s the ideal world for them.”

Let me parse that for you with a few substitutions in case the parallel I have drawn is not clear enough.

“The last thing the Workers Party wants is for any of those guys to collapse.” For one thing, it could be politically disastrous for the opposition party if it were considered responsible for the death of a grand Singaporean institution. “But it’s also completely worthless to the Workers Party in the political landscape,” mjuse adds. “They’re winning all the seats they can win already. What they actually want is just continuous, slow decline — decline at the same rate that they have the ability to organically expand. That’s the ideal world for them.”

The general Singapore population is not ready for a government that is not majority PAP. As Yawning Bread has frequently put it, the average Singaporean is not desirous of a complete change in government; they just want the social compact of old renewed: surrender of civil rights, liberties and a robust democracy in exchange for economic growth and the good life.

The average Singaporean wants a bigger, more equitable slice of the pie. They don't have a problem with the baker who bakes the pie (other than his miserly ways) or the taste of the pie itself.

[As an aside, some very intelligent people have postulated that in today's consumerist, capitalist society, the pie is in fact rotten in toto. I am sympathetic to this argument. But then again, I'm a greenie. You can read more here.]

I don't buy the argument about Workers Party wanting to be a "co-driver" to keep the PAP on its toes. Politics is ultimately about power, and the Workers Party eventually wants to be in the driver's seat. So, why mess with something that has worked? Given the realities of our population's sentiments, PAP-lite is the way to go if a political party wants to eventually come to power in Singapore. Low Thia Khiang obviously understands this. Anything more radical than that is a path to political marginalization.

I know educated urbane professionals who, while they have problems with the PAP's arrogance and high-handedness, have difficulty imagining a post-PAP Singapore. These are the middle class folks who decide the shape of our political landscape.

So, when the WP says that they will work with the PAP going forward, I keep getting that creepy tingly feeling like a brush of cold fingers across the back of the neck. And I'm not even a PAP flunky.

Keep your friends close, but keep your enemies closer. *Shudder*.

One further thing. You might think that I'm referring only to the PAP in the above paragraph when I state that the Workers Party wants a slow decline. Really, that applies equally to all the other opposition parties. The WP is cannibalizing the opposition vote where they can.

Ironically, the beneficiary of the decline in the vote share of the other opposition parties could well be the PAP, if voting tactically is no longer something to consider as the WP becomes more significant in Singapore politics and less differentiated from the PAP.

As one last aside, differentiating themselves further by casting themselves more left or right of the PAP/WP, or carving out a niche issue in which they enjoy strong support could be a viable strategy in the future for an opposition party to play kingmaker, in the event coalition government ever comes to Singapore.

The PAP AIM Saga

Predictably, with the PAP finding it increasingly difficult to explain why Aljunied Town Council sold their computer system to a PAP-owned company when Aljunied was controlled by the PAP, the PM decided on the nuclear option of lawyering up. A lawyer's letter was sent to Yawning Bread demanding an apology, which Yawning Bread complied with.

Separately, Tan Chuan Jin did the same to Vincent Wijeysingha over comments he made in relation to the SMRT strike fiasco.

This is what you do when you realize that you are losing control of the conversation. Send in the lawyers and shut down the entire conversation.

[Oh, and put in a few nice articles of the PM patting the shoulders of students and Chan Chun Sing reading to kids at the library -- see today's Straits Times (6 January 2013) in the pages following the articles on the apologies.

I am reminded of George W. Bush reading "The Pet Goat" during the events of 9/11. Note to Straits Times editors: anodyne pictures do nothing to dispel citizens' disquietude with what the hell is going on with AIM. If anything, they only serve to reinforce the perception that our ministers are completely disconnected from the ground. Straits Times editors, you need to go back to propaganda school.]

Frankly, I am bemused by this whole turn of affairs. For the two activists under legal injunction to retract their words, there is no shame attached to apologizing over a defamation charge from the PAP. Everyone knows the PAP doesn't fight fair. Apologizing is easy and the better part of valor. In fact, being served with a defamation letter is a sign that you're being taken seriously.

It is not, however, the PAP's cheap tactics which I find distasteful; politics is inherently dirty. What is particularly odious is the hypocrisy. Despite what Goh Chok Tong once said about the PAP being a party of 'junzi', the PAP really is a party from the 'hood. Lee Kuan Yew himself said that famous quote about putting on knuckledusters and ambushing his opponents in a cul-de-sac.

There may not have been very many palatable options other than lawyering up and putting a stop to this particular AIM conversation, unlike that time-waster of a national conversation. Still, by doing so, the PAP has opened several cans of worms.

The first is the ineffectiveness of such a move. The words "Pyrrhic victory" come to mind. This is the information age. What's online stays online, as anyone who has ever been tagged in some particularly mortifying picture on Facebook would have found out.

If someone was so inclined, setting up several mirror sites to mirror the content of objectionable (to the PAP that is) sites would be a cinch. Heck, your average content scraper or forummer copying and pasting articles wholesale onto forums alone would ensure the longevity of any web content. And Google's PageRank algorithm guarantees that should enough people access the link, it will automatically float to the top of the search rankings.

And everyone's connected to the Internet these days, to judge from the number of iPhones I am surrounded with each time I board the MRT. Get with the program already. A gag order, particularly on Internet content, is no longer effective in the information age. It just shows that you're...out of touch. Then again, perhaps the party from the 'hood hasn't heard of smartphones.

The second thing to note is that by lawyering up, the mainstream media has to report on the controversy. Cue Striesand Effect. As terse as the Straits Times would prefer to be, and they were indeed very tight-lipped, they still had to explain why exactly the PM found Yawning Bread's articles defamatory, and that just puts front and center the raison d'etre behind the whole AIM Saga: why was a town council system developed with public funds sold to a company controlled by a political party by the politicians then in charge of the town council?

The last time I remember the mainstream media having to twist a story into such unnatural contortions was during the floods of yesteryear, when they hastened to explain what the government was doing before describing how f***ed up bad the flooding situation was on one particular weekend. Remember putting the cart before the horse?

The third can of worms is that employing a defamatory charge as a first and last resort is inherently a self-liquidating power. Self-liquidating because each time you use it, it becomes far less convincing. The PAP has resorted to defamation charges countless times. So much so that it has become predictable and boring (which in my mind, is the bigger crime. I hate boring. That includes people and things.).

See above my point on defamation no longer carrying any stigma whatsoever for the defendants. It truly begs the question of whether PAP politicians are really being defamed each time they cry foul, or do they in fact have malfeasance to hide. I am reminded of City Harvest's strenuous protestations of innocence on the part of its high priests. Apparently, the party from the 'hood is not so different from a cult either.

A completely separate point about self-liquidating powers is that they're often so effective at first that their users quickly stop thinking of alternatives. Strategies and tactics work...until they don't. The PAP's key strategy of using the threat of defamation lawsuits to shut down criticism is looked about as dated as penicillin, and about as effective.

My fourth and last point is that more than any other incident from recent memory, the AIM saga erases any doubt in my mind of what I have conjectured before: that the PAP is more than willing to put party above country, and as a result, a smoking ruin is what will result prior to any transition of power.

You have been warned. Everyone needs a plan B.

SMRT Strike - Breaking the sacred chain of command

Yawningbread had a post on the recent SMRT bus strike. In his post, he commented on the ineffectiveness of official channels for dispute resolution. Here’s the pertinent section:

The government has also said, repeatedly, that workers should have “discussed” their issues with management. Knowing Chinese workers, I am sure they have, many times and loudly. It’s in their nature. The problem is that the system is stacked against them. It’s a very Singaporean system: where lower-rank people don’t have rights to justice, but can only plead for better treatment. It’s a microcosm of the political system this government has created. Citizens have no substantive rights; they can only plead for their wishes to be taken into account. There’s a term for this: The petitionary state.

My first reaction to this was: but the Chinese workers came from *the* original petition state (see here for instance), so surely they should comprehend the Singapore system perfectly. 

But I digress. Snarky humor aside, I have another insight to share. But first, let me tell you a story.

I used to work in a division of a quasi-government company headed by a former SAF general. He had a pet peeve, and here when I use the word “peeve”, I really mean (from the perspective of the general) reprehensible, egregiously bad behavior that deserves to be excoriated in the strongest possible terms.

You get the idea.

This pet peeve was what the general called “breaking the chain of command”.

He would expound on the importance of the chain of command every time a complaint surfaced from the staff at the ground level, bypassing him to reach the ears of human resource, other senior management, or the CEO himself.

In simple terms, he hated it every time a problem in his division cropped up without coming up through the official channels, namely through him. He probably thought it made him look bad, which to be fair, is a pretty logical deduction to make.

His take was that even if a problem required the CEO’s intervention, the request should be escalated through him rather than brought up directly by the individual.

It never occurred to him that part of the problem was with him, that some staff were either not comfortable coming to him with their grievances or that they felt their concerns would not be properly addressed.

The uncharitable would add that most people avoided coming to him because they expected (correctly, as was unfortunately often the case) that his initial reaction would be to stonewall them.

In my experience, the expectation of the general that all staff adhere to the chain of command was really not that unique of a trait among SAF personnel, both former and current. I clearly remember the commanding officer of my NSF battalion espousing a similar sentiment.

The point of the foregoing story is this:

Our government is stuffed to the gills with people who think this way, from former fulltime professional soldier officers like the recently anointed Chan Chung Sing and Tan Chuan Jin, to our Prime Minister who formerly held the illustrious rank of Brigadier General.

It should hardly come as a surprise that the government likes to stress the importance of working through official channels when it comes to resolving disputes.

There are lots of issues worth exploring here.

One issue is whether recourse can truly be found through official channels in Singapore. Whether you think so or not depends on how cynical you are, and whether you have had firsthand experience navigating the system.

Yawning Bread has brought another issue into his post: namely the lamentable state of our petitionary state. That sounds quite anodyne really. I prefer to call it the PAP’s dictum to Singaporeans to “Be silent and be governed.” Citizens’ opinions don’t matter until seats in Parliament are suddenly up for grabs. The recent national conversation is really just a grand exercise in perception management.

My preferred issue to focus on is what this strong aversion to anything that doesn't originate from official channels tells us about the decision-making processes in the higher echelons of the Singapore government.

That the government constantly stresses that labor relations (and other matters by extension) can only be negotiated only within the ambit of official channels indicates that the government:

1. Cannot handle uncertainty. Our officials are world champions at planning, but are frequently caught flatfooted whenever a situation develops that they failed to anticipate. That’s not to say that other governments do better all the time in unscripted situations, but a tendency to over-plan typically means less of an ability to adapt to a changing situation. The fact that even elections are carefully choreographed affairs is not complimentary of our cabinet ministers. For supposed consummate actors in the rough and tumble world of politics, our ministers are in a word, coddled.
2. Cannot handle negative media attention. This has to do with point (1) above. Our officials are bad at adapting to dynamic situations. When was the last time we had a minister answer unscripted questions posed to them by an independent journalist or interviewer who had not been warned implicitly or explicitly to go easy on the minister?
3. Has an attitude that no news is good news.
4. And that what isn’t surfaced through official channels doesn’t exist and is hence officially NOT A PROBLEM. In other words, the PAP likes to operate within its own personal reality distortion field. Too bad they don’t have the charisma of Steve Jobs as well cuz they sure as hell need it.

Point number 4 above is the most important point. But the other points are related in that the PAP has been so effective at building a safe, controlled political environment for itself that it has started believing in its own propaganda and hence frames its governing decisions accordingly. That's a dangerous place to be, drinking your own Kool-aid.

The upshot of seeing things surfaced only through official channels means tunnel vision, and all the associated bad decision-making that goes with it. And we haven't even brought in the stonewalling that all too often blocks what you can see of the information that floats up through official channels.

Case in point is the recent SMRT strike where unhappiness had in fact been simmering on the ground for months.

The remarkable thing is that considering Singapore is so small, so tightly controlled and with such a precisely defined and controlled government machinery (including the media), that the government still cannot get reliable information and act on it is a severe indictment of its ability to sense-make and come to effective and appropriate decisions.

Who knows what other problems are out there just waiting to explode? All thanks to the reality distortion field associated with the chain of command.

But again, I come to the stupid or evil hypothesis for the PAP, which I can never decide between. Are they really that dense, or are they just plain evil and actually prefer the status quo, which while detrimental to the resilience of our society, benefits themselves and the entrenched power elite.

See Jon Stewart for a more elaborate explanation of the stupid-evil dichotomy.

I am personally more inclined toward the evil hypothesis, but I am also reminded of Hanlon's Razor.

What a Non-PAP elected President Means

The Presidential post in Singapore is largely a ceremonial position with no legislative powers. The key powers are veto powers, and frankly, with the comfortable, greater than two thirds majority that the ruling party enjoys in Parliament, those veto powers are largely moot.

Many people have commented on this, and as a result, have taken the view that the importance of the Presidential elections should be de-emphasised. Mr Shanmugam has also downplayed the importance of the role of the President.

The first view is a merely a mistake. The second is disingenuous.

We do not need to look further than Tony Tan to see how seriously the PAP is taking the Presidential elections. Although they have not stated it, it is clear from the extensive glowing coverage of Tony Tan in the “lamestream” media in recent weeks that he is the unofficial PAP-endorsed candidate. If the position was not very powerful or important, why would the PAP care so much about helping their preferred candidate win?

One of the most important ways that the ruling party has managed to hold power over the decades is the way it has managed to control the national conversation on national policies.

I have written on this in a previous post. By controlling the major media levers, the PAP holds the power of framing conversations on national policies (although this power is diminishing in the Information Age). And this has the effect of making it difficult for rational individuals in the population to form coherent and reasoned objections to policies that can then reach a wider audience and garner support. 

A good propaganda system goes beyond simply trumpeting the virtues of such and such a policy. It ranges from setting up straw men counterarguments for the sake of “balance” in reporting, inundating the population with artfully conjured up statistics, redacting unhelpful information that detracts from the nation-building agenda, and taking surveys whose results give the appearance that all is hunky-dory on the surface, but wherein the survey methodology falls apart under even cursory scrutiny. More sophisticated techniques involve setting up and covertly funding or implicitly supporting “independent” think tanks that deliver voluminous research in support of existing or soon-to-be implemented policies.

Seen in this light, it is not difficult to understand why the President, even in a ceremonial role, has considerable power, power that has the potential to detract from the government’s carefully crafted policy messages.

Being a public figure with a public profile higher than the average MP, and perhaps on a par with a cabinet minister, the President may have no formal legislative powers, but he has the power of political patronage. He can make alternative viewpoints more credible. This is something which Yawning Bread wrote on in a recent piece. He can lend the prestige of his office and his voice to various causes which at best, do not enjoy PAP support, and at worst, are antithetical to the PAP’s ideologies.

And that is why the PAP government has a huge stake in the Presidential elections, even if it takes pains to appear distant (and for good reason, given the revelation of its declining popularity in GE 2011). 

A President who does not toe the PAP party line (even if he is not a card-carrying member of the PAP, so to speak) on government policies can strike a singularly discordant note in the symphony that the government perpetually plays in an effort to convince the citizenry that the bitter medicine being doled out is indeed good for them. Who knows? He might even be shriller than the small coterie of opposition MPs in Parliament today.

And make no mistake; the PAP dreads the possibility of a President who is a loose cannon. Perhaps because our government is stuffed with technocrats and functionaries, many of whom were earmarked for the fast track early on in their careers, and who never had to practice at mollifying, scrambling, ‘fessing up and apologising, or just plain rolling with the punches, that the PAP is remarkably bad at dealing with situations that arise because they fall outside of its planning norms.

The very idea that the President was vested with the power to block drawing on the reserves was conceived under the presumption that the President would be a PAP man facing down the temporary anomaly of a hostile non-PAP-led Parliament. And now, the shoe is on the other foot.

The outcome that the PAP fears the most is not a rabidly anti-PAP President. That would be the second worst outcome.

The worst outcome would be a popular and vocal President, with a centrist position that is not in concord with the PAP’s policies, and who has excellent oratorical skills and is not afraid to use them. 

The popularity factor is key. A rabidly PAP President would be an embarrassment certainly, but could be dismissed as “fringe” for the most part, and suitably stonewalled and marginalized.

The PAP’s methods of “managing” a popular and vocal President, however, would come off as unseemly at best. More likely than not, they would be perceived by the public as being ham-handed. 

And the real danger in this election is that the President would almost by definition be a popular one. After all, it is because the position comes without legislative powers that party candidacy, gerrymandering, HDB upgrading, political track record, and all the other messy calculations associated with who to vote for in a general election don’t come into play.

In other words, being elected President means being liked. Needless to say, in recent years, the PAP and their ilk haven’t been very good at that.

GE 2011 aftermath, random quick thoughts, and prognostications.

This post is going to be written stream-of-consciousness style...
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Is the PAP going to mend its ways, or is it going to be business as usual? I would like to think the former will happen, but I am very skeptical. Many PAP politicians seem too ideologically wedded to their positions (Mah Bow Tan, Lim Swee Say, Lui Tuck Yew, the list goes on...). Certainly, few if any would publicly backtrack on their stated policies. The PM apologised in this election for his government's performance (garnering a 3.2% improvement in vote share for Ang Mo Kio relative to GE 2006), but tellingly, no other politician did, least of all those who were responsible for policies causing the most grief to the electorate (e.g. Mah Bow Tan). Still, given the apparent act of contrition by the PM, a wait-and-see approach seems warranted.

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More people will be willing to step forward to stand for elections for opposition parties, particularly the WP. The risk-reward ratio has changed with the WP's success in Aljunied. The WP can only grow stronger with their increased popularity and rising public profile. I have no doubt their efforts at recruitment of quality candidates from the private sector will be far more fruitful than the PAP, as I have previously stated.
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The practice of slipping in weak PAP candidates into Parliament via "safe" GRCs helmed by prominent politicians will be reassessed by the PAP. That doesn't mean that the practice will be abandoned, only that it will be exercised with greater care. Frankly, the fact that the PAP had to scrape up a Tin Pei Ling from the bottom of the barrel to make up the numbers betrays the difficulty they have in recruiting loyal, quality candidates in number. The parachute tactic will continue to be a necessary part of the PAP's election arsenal as long as Tin Pei Ling-types continue to be selected.

However, I am grateful for one thing. Thanks to the fact that Marine Parade GRC was actually contested in GE 2011 (the last time it was contested was in 1991!), it is now possible to quantify the effect of the parachute tactic on vote share (the "Tin Pei Ling effect").

Marine Parade GRC, helmed by Goh Chok Tong in 1991, secured 77.2% of the vote share, versus 56.65% in 2011. The average PAP vote share in 1991 was 61%, versus 60.14% in 2011, virtually the same. The TPL effect could hence have accounted for as much as a 19.69% [(77.2%-56.65%)-(61%-60.14%)] swing in vote share.

This estimate is a high ceiling estimate; the swing in vote share can also be attributed to Goh Chok Tong's diminished popularity, the fact that he is no longer PM as he was in 1991, the generally inferior quality of opposition party candidates in 1991, and of course, the polar opposite "Nicole Seah effect". Granted all that and the fact that 1991 and 2011 are literally 20 years apart, but I think the TPL effect is probably good for a 5% vote swing against the PAP.

Given that the PAP's average vote share in GE 2011 stands at about 60%, that means that a GRC "lifeboat" can probably only comfortably accommodate at most one low quality free-rider, assuming linear additivity. More than that and the PAP risks sinking the entire GRC.

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Prof Jayakumar has noted that the fact that an Opposition had won a Group Representation Constituency (GRC) proves that the political system in Singapore works and does not benefit only the ruling party (see here). This statement is disingenuous. The fact that it has taken this long for an opposition party to win a GRC, with a team clearly superior to the one fielded by the PAP in Aljunied, in a more favorable political climate, and almost all constituencies contested that hence diluted the PAP's strength, is an exception that proves the rule that GRCs disadvantage opposition parties.

It is possible that with the loss of Aljunied, the PAP may rejig the GRC system to stack the deck further in its favor. Jayakumar's statement above provides the perfect validation for such a tactic.

It is especially important for the PAP to adjust the GRC system if more Tin Pei Ling-types are to be put up by the PAP in future elections. Lifeboats need to get bigger for a wider margin of safety. Equally, the PAP is having difficulty recruiting quality candidates in number to "hold down the fort". Cabinet ministers and other heavy-weights can only be spread so thinly over so many constituencies. We may see the advent of 8-member GRCs in the not-too-distant future.

Perhaps a more stringent requirement to have not one but two minority race candidates in each GRC. Perhaps even a hard requirement to have one Malay and one Indian candidate in each GRC. This would raise barriers to entry for the opposition even higher than they already are now.

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One of the most startling things I observed when I stepped into a polling station for the very first time was the sheer number of old folks streaming in to vote. They came on walkers, canes and wheelchairs. Singapore's population has aged, and the oldest, staunchest of the PAP's supporters are literally aging and dying.

Lee Kuan Yew *may* have been right in saying that the young don't know better to vote PAP don't appreciate the struggles that we have gone through as a nation. Nonetheless, even the PAP has to acknowledge the relentless tide of mortality that is carrying away its most loyal bloc of voters. It must adjust its strategy and tactics accordingly if it is to remain victorious in the elections ahead. The Generational Shift Effect is starting to make itself felt, and it will grow stronger in the years to come.

___

If the recent PAP campaign is any indicator of how the PAP manages its internal affairs in planning and implementing public policies, then I am apprehensive what the future holds.

We had ministers saying things that contradicted each other, unilateral party reform proposed by one minister, and blame-shifting. Not to forget the MM's vote-WP-and-repent threat. Or the PM's apology that was followed by conspicuous silence by all the other ministers.

Ladies and gentlemen, it appears that we have preliminary indications of schisms and factionalism within the PAP itself. If this is what happens in public, what happens behind closed doors?

Then there is that vexing matter of who the next PM should be, as there is no heir apparent waiting in the wings at the moment. That means that the issue of succession is still very much undecided.

The PM can reshuffle ministers and redeploy those who are the most unpopular but who were nonetheless re-elected (Mah Bow Tan comes to mind). But every time he does so, he expends just that much more of his political capital within the PAP. If you were Mah Bow Tan and you kept insisting that housing was affordable, how kindly would you look on the PM deciding to reassign you to a different portfolio? You can only push people so much before they start pushing back.

The electorate is changing and demanding more choices. Is it possible that the PAP may also be changing and becoming more individualistic? And what might that mean for policy-making in the future?

Assessing the Generational Shift Effect in GE 2011

This is a technical post, so it will be rather dry. Going by previous pageviews, I doubt many people will be interested to read further, but nonetheless, I will need to perform the analysis and archive the results here for my own records.

The Generational Shift Effect (GSE) was previously defined here. The objective of this post is to assess whether such an effect is in fact present.

Given the differences between each election in terms of candidates, issues and media use, it is a futile exercise to rigorously reduce the results of each election to individually quantifiable covariates. My approach here is to simply look at the data and to check for interesting trends.

To recap, the constituencies that I identified as possibly manifesting the GSE were Radin Mas, Pioneer, Moulmein-Kallang, Sembawang, Sengkang West and Punggol East. This group consists of 4 SMCs and 2 GRCs.

My approach is to compare the PAP's vote share in each constituency in GE 2011 and to compare it against the PAP's vote share in the most recent previous election. However, except for Sembawang (which in fact has had its boundaries redrawn), none of the constituencies in the group above existed in recent history prior to GE 2011. This may seem like a bad thing, but it does have a silver lining.

While previous data may not be directly comparable to current data due to redrawn GRC boundaries, every new constituency in 2011 has a progenitor GRC. We can compare the PAP's vote share for say, Sengkang West SMC in 2011 versus Ang Mo Kio GRC (its progenitor) in 2006. We can also compare the PAP's vote share for Sengkang West SMC in 2011 against Ang Mo Kio GRC in 2011. So, in effect, we have two data points for comparison.

What we are really interested in are differences. Using our example above, we can calculate how well the PAP fared in Sengkang West in 2011 versus 2006 (using Ang Mo Kio as a proxy), taking the difference [1st difference]. We can also calculate how well the PAP fared in Ang Mo Kio between 2011 and 2006, again taking the difference [2nd difference]. It is the divergence between these two differences that may be attributed to the GSE (and other factors).

Now, let's turn to the data. I have excluded Radin Mas SMC from this analysis. Radin Mas was carved out from Tanjong Pagar, which has had walkovers for the longest time, so historical voting data is unavailable. In addition, the 'Lee Kuan Yew effect' in Tanjong Pagar would probably swamp any other effect, so I'm not even going to bother with further analysis here.

Table 1 below shows PAP vote shares for the constituencies of interest in GE 2011 as well as the most recent election. Except for Sembawang GRC, data for the previous election is taken from the progenitor GRC. Also, all previous data relates to GE 2006, except for West Coast GRC, which was last contested in GE 1997.

  Table 1. Comparing PAP vote shares for each constituency across elections. Larger image here.  

  

From Table 1, it is clear that the PAP's vote share has declined for all the constituencies under study. But how does this compare to the progenitor GRCs?


Table 2 below reproduces the rightmost column from Table 1, and includes another column showing the change in the PAP's vote share in the progenitor GRCs. Note that Moulmein-Kallang progenitor data is unavailable since Moulmein-Kallang was carved out of Tanjong Pagar and Jalan Besar. Tanjong Pagar was uncontested and Jalan Besar no longer exists. In addition, I have included a column to show the change in the PAP's average vote share across elections.

Table 2. Comparing changes in PAP vote shares. Larger image here.

In every constituency under study (except Sembawang and Moulmein-Kallang), the drop in the PAP's vote share has exceeded the drop in the PAP's vote share in the progenitor GRC. It has also exceeded the drop in the average PAP vote share across elections. Most striking is the divergence seen in Sengkang West, which experienced a drop in PAP vote share by 8% while in contrast, its progenitor GRC of Ang Mo Kio actually improved in its PAP vote share by 3.2%.


In the case of Sengkang West, the large divergence in PAP vote share between Sengkang West and its progenitor is unlikely to be due to the GSE. It is far more likely due to the fact that Ang Mo Kio is helmed by PM Lee Hsien Loong. Similarly, the divergence for Punggol East may be explained by the presence of heavyweight Teo Chee Hean in progenitor Pasir Ris-Punggol. On an opposite note, Moulmein-Kallang's poor performance for the PAP in 2011 may be more attributable to the presence of Yaacob Ibrahim (Orchard Road floods) and Lui Tuck Yew (hardly a ray of sunshine, see here).

For the remaining 2 constituencies, it is more difficult to reject the presence of the GSE. Khaw Boon Wan helms Sembawang GRC. Notwithstanding his $8 gaffe, he is still one of the PAP's more popular and stalwart politicians. Yet Sembawang fared poorly relative to the fall in the PAP's average vote share in this election (-12.8% vs -6.5%). This is an unexpected result which I interpret as the GSE exerting itself. For Pioneer SMC, I can't think of major reasons for the larger than expected fall in vote share except for the possibility that Pioneer is demographically much different from its progenitor, West Coast GRC. Again, I think the GSE could have exerted itself here.

Table 3 below summarizes the foregoing discussion in assessing the GSE. I have included a column showing which opposition parties contested in each constituency for GE 2011. Note that Sembawang and Pioneer, which I flagged as having a high likelihood of GSE, were contested by SDP and NSP respectively. The WP was the big opposition party winner in this election, presumably due to their branding, as surmised by Yawning Bread. So, we can exclude the "WP effect" from explaining the large falls in PAP vote share these two constituencies. In addition, neither SDP nor NSP fielded their 'A' teams or top candidates in these constituencies as well, so candidate differences should be muted.

Table 3. Likelihood of GSE and possible explanations. Larger image here.

Voting along municipal lines: Penny-wise, Pound Foolish

I have never accepted the logic behind voting along municipal lines in Singapore. Never.

For many years, one of the main reasons that Singaporeans have given for not voting for opposition party candidates is that the quality of candidates standing in their constituencies has been poor. And the quality of opposition party candidates has indeed been generally poor for much of Singapore's history.

Even Singaporeans disgruntled with the PAP frequently vote for the PAP when they perceive that opposition party candidates in their constituencies are inferior in breeding, credentials or capability compared to PAP candidates, which is often. I expect this election to be no different.

On the surface, this would make perfect sense. After all, who wants a doofus to represent them in Parliament? How could a clown the likes of many opposition party politicians effectively champion the interests of their constituents, particularly in a PAP-dominated parliament that is known to place Singaporeans in opposition wards last?

To me, however, this is missing the point entirely. Think of the last 5, 10 years. What issues have impacted your life the most? What have your heaviest concerns been about? What are the root causes of your worries, your angsts, and the things that keep you up late at night?

Almost without exception, I think I can state categorically that the most immediate concerns of most Singaporeans stem from issues related to national policies implemented in the last 10 years. These policies heavily impact important issues such as the cost of living, housing, influx of foreigners, income inequality, unemployment, health care, retirement and education.

In Singapore, the PAP designs and implements all major policies that govern the lives of Singaporeans. These are NATIONAL policies. In this country, national policies impact your life the most, and they have far-reaching effects on you, your family and your children.

These policies are more important than whether your MP can successfully petition for public funds to be spent in your constituency on playgrounds, covered walkways, refurbished wet markets and other matters that I deem of little consequence. Even the value of your property (if you own one) is dictated more by decisions made at the national level, e.g. zoning and land use planning done by the URA, or transportation infrastructure planned by the LTA.

If you feel hard done in by the PAP's policies, and practically every middle-class or lower income Singaporean is a victim on some level or in some aspect of their life, but you vote PAP because you think that the opposition party candidates standing in your constituency "cannot make it", then you are shooting yourself in the foot. You are being penny-wise, but pound foolish.

Realistically speaking, the PAP will still form the next government after this election due to the preponderance of their vote-share. That means they will still get to appoint all the cabinet ministers and still get to set all national policies.

This election is not about forming a new government. It is a referendum on the policies set by the present government. If you can't stomach the thought of voting in that unknown MP wannabe from the opposition in your constituency, think of it not as him representing your interests, but as him a visible signal of your displeasure with the PAP and how they must change their policies for the benefit of all Singaporeans.

All of the above would be true even if the quality of all opposition candidates was uniformly poor. But that is not true today. Today, the quality of many opposition candidates is as good, if not better, than the PAP candidates.

Many Singaporeans are excited about the contest in Aljunied, and I dare say, envious. They are envious not because voters in Aljunied actually have a realistic chance of voting in opposition party politicians in this election, but because Aljunied voters are in an enviable position of having to pick between two credible teams vying for their vote. It is not a dilemma, as some fool of a PAP supporter pointed out. It is a lovely feeling to be courted. A feeling that unfortunately few Singaporeans can claim to have experienced.

If you live in a constituency that has credible opposition party candidates, and you are unhappy with the current government's policies, you have no excuse not to vote for the opposition party.

If you are like me, and you live in a constituency contested by opposition party candidates that lack credibility, you still have good reason to vote for the opposition if you have felt victimized by our current government's policies. As I have highlighted above, voting along municipal lines is a case of being penny-wise, pound foolish. The wiser decision would be to vote along party lines.

Related to this is the great fear, played up by the PAP and their sycophantic mainstream media, that voting in opposition party candidates is tantamount to inviting legislative gridlock.

First of all, as I have pointed out above, legislative gridlock is a dim possibility given that the PAP is unlikely to lose more than 50% of seats in parliament. They will likely still get to pass all the policies they want. In fact, they are likely to retain more than the two thirds majority required to change the constitution at will, the highest law in the land.

Secondly, and this is an important point that I have not seen anyone in the media or blogosphere make, from my perspective as an average Singaporean, I do not think that legislative gridlock is such a bad thing if the policies that would have resulted otherwise were to impact my life negatively.

The PAP's greatest claim to fame is their contribution to economic growth. But as is patently clear to anyone who has an operating brain cell, the fruits of economic growth in this country have not been shared evenly, just like their costs. With every gain, there is a concomitant cost. The impressive rate of economic growth in recent years looks considerably less impressive when one takes into account the increased stresses that all of us experience from the rising cost of living, yawning income gaps, longer working hours, angst over retirement, more foreigners and strained infrastructure.

With regard to economic growth, ask yourself this: cui bono? Then ask yourself, who has borne the bulk of the costs?

Net-net, do you genuinely think that you are better off today? You MUST know the answer to this question if you are to vote wisely.

As a Singaporean, the last thing that I want in a government are smart, ambitious, capable people working against my best interests. Gridlock would be preferable. As Warren Buffett once put it, "In looking for people to hire, you look for three qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy. And if they don't have the first, the other two will kill you."

Even though the opposition party candidates in my constituency are less than impressive, I value them for what they are and what they represent to the PAP, rather than what they can do for me. I may not think highly of them, but they disagree with current PAP policy and like every opposition party, it is part of their campaign platform. As an instrument to convey my displeasure, that will suffice for my vote, at least for now.  

When in doubt, turn to the data (Generational Shift Effect)

"Younger voters in their 20s are more likely to vote for opposition parties than for the PAP. Conversely, older voters in their 50s and above are more likely to vote for the PAP."

If you do not agree with the above statement, you may safely ignore the rest of this post. If you do agree with the statement, then read on.

Nomination Day has come and gone and the battle lines have been drawn. The chips are in the air now, and who knows where they will fall?

I asked myself the same question and decided a little data sleuthing was in order.

I am no pundit, and I lack mystical powers that allow me to read the sentiment on the ground. What I have however, is census data, and a belief that younger folks are more likely to want change, while older folks would prefer the status quo.

The logical question to ask then, is in which constituencies do younger folks comprise a larger percentage of the population now, while older folks comprise a smaller percentage of the population?

Demographic data by geographical region is available from Census 2000 and Census 2010. Note that geographical regions in Census 2010 are demarcated by the URA 2008 Masterplan available here. The most distinctive differences between the geographical regions demarcated by Census 2010 and Census 2000 are that Census 2010 includes 3 new regions: Singapore River, Mandai and Punggol. However, only Punggol among the three has a significant population today. Otherwise, I am assuming here that differences in geographical regions between the two census are small.

Those Singapore citizens who were aged 40 and above back in year 2000 are now aged 50 and above. In every single region, they comprise a smaller percentage of that region's population today due to the effects of mortality. In contrast, those Singapore citizens who were aged 10-19 in year 2000 are now aged 20 - 29 and of eligible voting age. Not all geographical regions have experienced an increase in the percentage of population who are of this young age group, due to marriage as well as moving out of the family home. However, in most geographical regions, they now do constitute a larger percentage of the population than in year 2000.

Why did I choose these age cut-off points? Because previous data analysis revealed that new PRs in the last 10 years are overwhelmingly in their 20s and 30s today. I can't separate out the new PRs from the citizens among the younger Singapore residents, but I can safely assume that census data relating to residents aged 50 and above today is unadulterated by the addition of new PRs .

For every geographical region, I calculated 4 numbers:

(1) Percentage of population older than 10 that was aged 10-19 in year 2000

(2) Percentage of voting population aged 20-29 in year 2010

(3) Percentage of population older than 10 that was aged 40 and above in year 2000

(4) Percentage of voting population aged 50 and above in year 2010

I define here the Generational Shift Effect (GSE)

GSE = [(2) - (1)] - [(4) - (3)]

or more simply

GSE = (2) - (1) - (4) + (3)

The GSE is an indicator of how much younger a population in a geographical region has become since the last census in 2000, and by extension, how much more likely a geographical region is likely to swing away from the PAP in this election as compared to the election in 2001.

Below is a table showing the regions with GSEs larger than 10%.

Larger image available here.

The next step is to match the geographical regions in the census data with the electoral map. The most detailed electoral map I could find is available here.

I lack the technical skills to superimpose the 2008 URA Masterplan with the electoral map, so all I did was to eye-ball the two maps and judge which constituency each geographical region with GSE > 10% fell in. These affected constituencies are indicated in the rightmost column in the table above.

Naturally, some geographical regions are small, so they are swamped by the rest of the constituency they fall into. However, a few geographical regions occupy enough of a constituency that I deem it possible that the GSE will manifest itself in these constituencies in this election. These constituencies have been bolded in the table above. Tanjong Pagar is a walkover constituency, so it has not been bolded.

The constituencies in which the GSE is most likely to manifest itself are, IMHO, Radin Mas, Pioneer, Moulmein-Kallang, Sembawang, Sengkang West and Punggol East.

These constituencies won't necessarily be lost by the PAP; it's just that I predict the fight will be closer than most people expect.

As I have previously mentioned, one of the effects of gerrymandering (and walkovers) is that the PAP has distorted the voting signals upon which political parties rely on to judge ground sentiment over the years. If the GSE is as significant as I expect it to be, it may come as a surprise to some people should it exert itself in this election.

On a separate note, interestingly, Tanjong Pagar is a constituency in which the GSE is very strong. However, it is a walkover constituency helmed by Lee Kuan Yew. When Lee Kuan Yew retires from his political career, I fully expect the GSE to exert itself in the following election. Many of his staunchest supporters are growing as old as he is and dying off. The numbers reflect this.

Why the PAP is finding it difficult to attract candidates from the private sector

I had thought that more people would have commented on the story published in the Straits Times on 16 April, on how few high flying executives from the private sector are willing to join the PAP. But apparently not.

Someone did comment on it, but while I do agree with some of the ideas in that post, my opinion is a little different, and more nuanced.

Why is the PAP finding it difficult to attract candidates from the private sector?

To answer that question, we must first ask why people enter politics.

People enter politics for a number of reasons, but the most important (and noble) reason must be the idea of wanting to make a difference.

Many of the most celebrated politicians in history took on positions of leadership precisely at the point when they perceived the need for a change in direction for their country. Take FDR for example. He rose to the occasion to become POTUS at the height of the Great Depression. It is in times of crisis that we see great leaders arise. Our Minister Mentor is another example.

When you keep that fact in mind, and you consider the nature and character of the PAP as it is today, it is not a surprise that they have problems recruiting candidates from the private sector.

The PAP today is in the business of maintaining the status quo. And I do mean business. Our economic and other policies have been deemed successful by our political elite, and as such, they have signaled that no change is warranted.

With their electioneering tactics and iron-grip control of the civil service, the PAP has assured itself victory in every election. And even its greenest candidates need not fear being rejected by the electorate; they can just coast in on the coat-tails of a "heavy-weight" under the GRC system. If there were such a thing as a election guarantee in a democracy, this would be it.

In other words, the PAP of today is not a party of fiery orators, impassioned visionaries or trailblazing mavericks, full of piss and vinegar, to borrow that piquant phrase.

They don't have to be. The PAP today is a party of technocrats and functionaries, where an efficient party apparatus guarantees risk-free victory at elections, and continuity of policy after election. Policy which is set at the highest levels of the PAP food chain, if I might add, immune to criticism and disquiet even within the party itself.

Indeed, mavericks are probably personae non grata in the PAP. Some people accuse the PAP of recruiting only those that agree with their policy-making views. I would go further. In the environment of the PAP, they can ONLY recruit those who agree with their views, as a true dissenter would probably find the PAP a lonely and hostile place.

Oh, we hear of various fresh PAP faces saying that they don't agree with this or that PAP policy. Riiight. Just as our national newspaper is fond of printing both sides of an issue to give the appearance of "balance", but inevitably ends on one side of the argument: the PAP's.

Dissenters in the PAP either don't last long, are marginalized (think the late President Ong Teng Cheong when he refused the play the role of a straw puppet and actually had the temerity to request for information on the national reserves), are co-opted, or were never true dissenters to begin with.

In light of this, it is not hard to imagine why, with few exceptions, high flying corporate executives have little desire to join the PAP.

Put yourself in the shoes of a corporate high flyer who actually has aspirations to make a difference, to become a politician.

If you genuinely have issues with the PAP's policies, you are unlikely to want to join them. Trying to change the PAP from within is likely a fool's errand.

Even if you do agree with the PAP's policies, the PAP is unlikely to be a place that can satisfy your political aspirations. It's a monolithic top-down structure, where policy is decided at the top, your role is to support the status quo, and you have to toe the line. Because, after all, it's not like you enjoy an independent power base among your constituents, especially if you coasted in on the coat-tails of another politician. How independent can your opinion be when you owe your place in Parliament to another politician?

Worse, as a former corporate warrior, you would have given up your high salary, perks AND privacy. And for what? For this pale shadow of being a politician? More like a entry level political lackey.

Being a PAP Member of Parliament would be singularly unattractive in this case. It would be a corporate job without the corporate perks. In other words, it would be a step DOWN from being a corporate high flyer. Even a corporate high flyer who agrees he has benefited disproportionately from the PAP's policies and wants them to continue. No thanks, he might say, I just want a free ride on your policies.

Conversely, what kinds of people would view becoming a PAP Member of Parliament as a step up?

Simple. The people who are already in the public eye, think only glowingly of existing policy, and fall very naturally into the position of deferring to authority in the form of senior PAP politicians.

No surprise. The civil service. And the quasi-governmental organizations like the NTUC.

If you are a high-ranking civil servant, becoming a cabinet minister would represent the logical pinnacle of your civil service career progression.

Not so for a private sector corporate executive who has political aspirations. The calculus is far different.

I have a prediction here to make.

The trends are clear. The PAP is recruiting less and less from the private sector, while the converse is occurring for the opposition parties, particularly those with credibility, like the Workers Party.

Should the opposition parties actually make headway in this coming election by, say, winning a GRC, it would be a watershed moment. Being an opposition party member would demonstrably seem less risky, and more people who want to make a difference, who actually have some fire in their hearts, would join the opposition political parties from the private sector.

In contrast, because the PAP is recruiting increasingly from the public sector, it is going to be seen as more and more insular, and will find it ever harder to recruit from the private sector. No outsider wants to belong to an clubby old boys association where every former civil servant knows every other former civil servant. And over time, the PAP will become more homogeneous than it is already.

Hard truths you won’t read about elsewhere, Part V

Our systems are brittle and our country is vulnerable. And our government has no desire to encourage a “crutch mentality”. It behoves every Singaporean to have a Plan B.

Many Singaporeans instinctively understand this hard truth, even though they may not articulate it.

The recent survey by the Institute of Policy Studies is telling. About half of young Singaporeans belong to the “Disengaged” and “Explorer” socio-psychological profile.

Interestingly, these profiles come from the more highly educated, higher income groups, who have presumably benefited more from the PAP’s economic policies than the lower income groups. Yet it is precisely the Disengaged and the Explorer who are pessimistic about Singapore’s economic future. The Explorer also feels threatened by foreign talent.

Why this irony?

Perhaps it is because the Disengaged and the Explorer, who have benefited more under the PAP’s policies, understand better the fragility upon which Singapore’s prosperity is built. And they also understand that what appears to be permanent can in fact be transient, that it can all vanish in a blink of the eye.

The PAP assiduously cultivates a siege mentality among the population, telling us that Singapore is highly vulnerable. Yet it would have us all believe that the PAP is the solution to Singapore’s problems, that self-sacrifice is what is required of all of us, that all of us need to close ranks around the PAP. Otherwise, the ship would capsize without the PAP at the helm.

Well, if Singapore were that vulnerable, should we not all express just a bit of scepticism at the PAP’s infallibility? That is a logical extension of the PAP’s own argument.

But no, that is not part of the official catechism. We are required to believe in the daunting odds we face as a nation, while suspending doubts as to the PAP’s abilities to shepherd Singaporeans through any storm.

And the PAP asks for more than just faith in their abilities, but also tolerance for their obscene salaries, and forbearance for personal costs on the part of citizens that grow more exacting with each policy that they implement. No crutch mentality here, thank you very much.

I wonder if the PAP realizes how successful they have been in instilling amongst Singaporeans the fear that Singapore is indeed vulnerable. The spectre of ever present disaster may have helped the PAP to solidify their grip on power over the decades, but at what cost?

We have imbibed the knowledge that tomorrow, this could all be over. And the PAP government has demonstrably shown through its policies and speeches and admonitions that as individual citizens, we're on our own; we shouldn't count on the government for retirement, healthcare, housing...even that ineffable feeling that this place should still feel like home, what with the incredible rate of immigration, and the attendant questions it raises of what citizenship here is really worth.

And we certainly shouldn't trouble the government with our disquietude. If we do, it's our fault, again. The implicit command is for us to be silent and be governed. If we participate, we are meant only to cheer, not to question.

Our national education programs talk loftily of a shared sense of destiny, of how our people are Singapore’s only resource, and yet the government has nurtured a crisis of affinity.

The statistic of importance is not how many youth are contemplating emigration now. It is how many youth would contemplate emigration in a time of countrywide bleakness.

Hard Truth #5 is not about emigration per se. It is about being prepared. As long as the living here is comfortable, there is no fear of Singaporeans activating Plan B. But Plan B exists. And it is ever at the back of everyone’s mind.

Once, while attending a Chinese New Year dinner hosted by the ambassador at the Singapore embassy in Washington DC, I overheard a spiel from a diplomat holding court amongst a group of university students. He claimed that for reasons of national security, our wealth [meaning reserves], must be kept outside of Singapore.

We should all take a leaf from the PAP’s investment playbook and hedge our bets abroad. Don't put all your eggs in the Singapore basket. What is good for the goose is also good for the gander .

I started this post by stating that many Singaporeans instinctively understand Hard Truth #5, even though they may not articulate it. For many of us, it is not a hard truth, but a simple reality, prudence even. I do not think I need to point out who the hard truth is meant for.